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COMMENT
Recoupment Under Dodd-Frank: Punishing Financial
Executives and Perpetuating "Too Big To Fail"
In July 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
promulgated new rules implementing Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These rules define a cause of action to
recoup compensation paid to senior executives and directors of failed nonbank
financial institutions placed into the FDIC's "orderly liquidation authority"
receivership. An action for recoupment is based on a negligence theory of
liability, but it does not require establishing that an executive's conduct caused
the financial institution any harm. The rules presume liability merely for
having held executive responsibility prior to the firm entering receivership. The
executive may rebut the presumption of negligent conduct, but not causation.
Put simply, a senior executive or director can lose two years of pay even if he or
she could conclusively establish the total absence of any link between his or her
conduct and the firm's failure.
This Comment argues that disconnecting recoupment from causation leads
to overdeterrence and perpetuates the dangerous phenomenon of "too big to
fail." In particular, executives may abstain from taking optimal risks that may
be mischaracterized later as negligent should other factors cause the firm's
failure. Such overdeterrence is likely to cause talented executives to gravitate
toward financial institutions that have the lowest risk of failure. Recoupment
thus imposes a cost concomitant with a firm's perceived risk of failure, giving
large, interconnected institutions an advantage when competing for managerial
talent. Indeed, the liquidation of firms perceived as "too big to fail" may be so
improbable that they can credibly offer executive compensation with little to no
risk of recoupment.
The remedy for this deficient rule is to make causation a rebuttable
presumption. Because executives can cheaply show that other factors were
responsible for the firm's failure, they would discount potential recoupment
liability chiefly by the likelihood of causing actual harm. This probability
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would not vary between firms, promoting healthy competition among financial
institutions and reversing the arbitrary advantages conferred by the current
regime on "too big to fail" firms. Retaining a presumption of causation would
still ease the evidentiary burden of holding financial executives accountable for
reckless behavior.
1. TITLE II AND RECOUPING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act grants the FDIC the authority to conduct an "orderly liquidation" of
"failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability
of the United States."' Under Title II, the FDIC may "act as the receiver" for a
"covered financial company."' A "covered financial company"' must meet a
series of criteria, including (1) being "in default or in danger of default"4 (as
defined in the statute5); (2) posing such a risk that "failure of the financial
company and its resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or State law
would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States" 6 ;
and (3) leaving no choice but a public rescue because "no viable private sector
alternative is available to prevent the default of the financial company."' As
receiver, the FDIC succeeds to the financial company,' operates it with the goal
1. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384(a) (West 2012).
2. Id. § 5384 (b).
3. The term "financial company" is defined as a "bank holding company"; a "nonbank
financial company supervised by the Board of Governors" of the Federal Reserve; "any
company that is predominantly engaged in activities that the Board of Governors has
determined are financial in nature or incidental thereto"; and any subsidiary of the
foregoing companies "that is predominantly engaged in activities that the board of
governors has determined are financial in nature or incidental thereto." Id. § 5381(a)(11).
4. Id. 5 5383(b)(1).
5. Id. 5 5383(c)(4) ("[A] financial company shall be considered to be in default or in danger of
default if... (A) a case has been, or likely will promptly be, commenced with respect to the
financial company under the Bankruptcy Code; (B) the financial company has incurred, or
is likely to incur, losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no
reasonable prospect for the company to avoid such depletion; (C) the assets of the financial
company are, or are likely to be, less than its obligations to creditors and others; or (D) the
financial company is, or is likely to be, unable to pay its obligations (other than those subject
to a bona fide dispute) in the normal course of business.").
6. Id. S 5383(b)(2).
7. Id. 5 5383(b)( 3).
8. Id. § 539o(a)(1)(A).
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of maximizing the value of its assets,' and ultimately must "liquidate, and
wind-up [its] affairs."'o
The statute does not, however, limit the FDIC's powers to operate the
failed financial institution. Title II also provides:
The Corporation, as receiver of a covered financial company, may
recover from any current or former senior executive or director
substantially responsible for the failed condition of the covered
financial company any compensation received during the 2-year period
preceding the date on which the Corporation was appointed as the
receiver of the covered financial company .... "
On July 14, 2011, the FDIC promulgated rules implementing this
recoupment authority." The rules empower the FDIC to "file an action" to
recover any compensation paid in the preceding two years as provided in the
statute." The rules provide that a "senior executive or director" shall be
"substantially responsible" for the financial company's failure if he or she:
(1) Failed to conduct his or her responsibilities with the degree of
skill and care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances, and
(2) As a result, individually or collectively, caused a loss to the
covered financial company that materially contributed to the failure of
the covered financial company under the facts and circumstances.'*
These conditions reflect a negligence theory of liability, which requires
establishing failure to act with reasonable care, causation, and injury." But the
9. Id. 5 53 9o(a)(1)(B)(iv).
10. Id. 5 5390(a)(1)(D).
M. Id. § 5390(s)(1).
12. 12 C.F.R. 5 380.7 (2012).
13. Id. 5 380.7(a).
14. Id. While this language suggests two independent causation elements -causing loss to the
company and such loss materially contributing to its failure-these can be treated
conceptually as a single requirement for this analysis because both are conclusively
presumed under the rules. See also infra note 18 (discussing conclusive presumption of
causation).
1s. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 164-65 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) (defining negligence as consisting of four elements: (i) a "duty ... requiring the
person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks"; (2) a "failure on the person's part to conform to the standard
required"; (3) a "reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
509
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rules establish a presumption that allows for recoupment without proving
causation:
It shall be presumed that a senior executive or director is substantially
responsible ... under any of the following circumstances:
(i) The senior executive or director served as the chairman of the
board of directors, chief executive officer, president, chief financial
officer, or in any other similar role regardless of his or her title if in this
role he or she had responsibility for the strategic, policymaking, or
company-wide operational decisions of the covered financial company
prior to the date that it was placed into receivership under the orderly
liquidation authority of the Dodd-Frank Act . . . .
In essence, these executives are presumed liable solely based on title and
responsibility. Moreover, this presumption may only "be rebutted by evidence
that the senior executive or director conducted his or her responsibilities with
the degree of skill and care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances."" Such language indicates that an
executive may disprove only the first element of recoupment- negligent
conduct-but not causation.'8 Put simply, a senior executive or director can
lose two years of pay even if market forces like tightening credit conditions or
injury"; and (4) "[a]ctual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another" (footnotes
omitted)).
16. 12 C.F.R. § 38o.7(b)(i)(i). This presumption does not apply to senior executives "hired ...
during the two years prior . . . to assist in preventing further deterioration of the financial
condition of the covered financial company" or directors "who joined the board of directors
. . . under an agreement or resolution to assist in preventing further deterioration of the
financial condition of the covered financial company." Id. § 380.7(b)( 3). The rules also
establish other presumptions of liability under certain scenarios, id. § 380.7(b)(1)(ii)-(iv),
but these are rebuttable as to causation, id. § 38o.7(b)(2); see also infra note 18 (discussing
conclusive presumption of causation).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(b)(2).
18. This subsection reproduces word-for-word the first element of liability under 12 C.F.R.
§ 38o.7(a), indicating that negligent conduct alone is rebuttable. Moreover, the rules
expressly permit rebutting causation when such a presumption arises in other contexts. See
id. S 38o.7(b)(l)-(2) (listing other presumptions and stating expressly that they are
rebuttable). This discrepancy implies that causation is nonrebuttable here. See also FDIC's
Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under the Orderly Liquidation Authority, DAvis POLK &
WARDWEuL LLP 16 (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.davispolk.con/files/Publication/7b49do31
-5cfl-4e6 5-ao66-oobda7e3546f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/14cffSec-bf6e-4c26
-95be-2did15e81542/o2411OIA prop-rule-sum.pdf (concluding that the proposed version
of this subsection, unchanged in the final rules, imposes a conclusive presumption of
causation).
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employee misconduct like fraud or embezzlement caused the firm to fail."
Liability attaches even if the executive can conclusively establish the total
absence of any causal link between his or her conduct and the firm's failure.
The FDIC has provided little explanation of the rationale behind the
conclusive presumption of causation. It has merely stated that the rule is
"aligned with the intent shown in the statutory language."2 o The history of the
statutory provision for recoupment indicates that it was driven by a popular
backlash against executives of failed firms receiving substantial compensation
alongside government support." When introducing the amendment providing
for recoupment, Senator Robert Corker stated:
No question, the bonuses and things we saw, after getting taxpayer
money to make sure they survived, no doubt that created a backlash. As
a matter of fact, the Senator from Virginia and I are working on an
amendment that would say, if this ever happens again and we have to
take one of these firms through resolution, which is part of the Dodd
bill right now, the bonuses and other types of things in recent years
would all be clawed back. You cannot make huge sums of money, take
your company down the tubes, and do things to America in that way
without paying a price."
While liquidation under Title II is not a bailout," Senator Corker's
statement suggests that the rule was intended to further a similar populist
policy of denying compensation to executives of failed institutions under
government-supervised liquidation.
ig. See FDIC's Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Under the Orderly Liquidation Authority,
supra note 18, at 16 (listing examples of failure without causation as "market forces, illegal
behavior, fraud by some third party or governmental policies or actions").
20. Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions Under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626, 41,631 (July 15, 2011).
21. See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer & Laura Litvan, Geithner Vows To Recoup AIG Bonuses as
Lawmakers Express Fury, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a TbsRunotbQi see also Eric Dash, Wall St. Pay Is a
Focus of Many in Washington, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2olo
/ol/13/business/13bank.html (describing efforts to recoup executive compensation in the
financial sector in response to popular outrage over bank bonuses). The amendment
containing the recoupment provision was introduced shortly after this uproar. 156 CONG.
REc. S3195-3200 (daily ed. May 5, 2010).
22. 156 CONG. REc. S2 9 9 3- 9 4 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2010) (statement of Sen. Robert Corker).
23. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5394(a) (West 2012) ("All financial companies put into receivership under
this subchapter shall be liquidated.").
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II. INEFFICIENT OVERDETERRENCE OF INDIVIDUAL EXECUTIVES
Liability without causation is dangerous because causation promotes
economic efficiency. In A Theory of Negligence, Judge Richard Posner explained
why this is so:
If the defendant was negligent but the accident would have occurred
anyway, it would be incorrect to view the costs of the accident as the
consequence of his negligence since they would not have been avoided
by the exercise of due care. . . . Punishment for negligence would close
an important safety valve in the negligence system. A standard of care is
necessarily a crude approximation to optimality. Allowing enterprises a
choice whether to comply or pay the social costs of violation may
permit a closer approximation.'
Awarding monetary damages equal to actual injury permits the defendant
to internalize the social cost of his or her conduct. This promotes efficiency
when the legal standard of reasonable care differs from truly optimal behavior.
By divorcing negligence from causation, the FDIC's new rules inefficiently
overdeter individual financial executives.
The new rules exacerbate the crudeness of the "approximation to
optimality" that Judge Posner identifies. The rules define a "business
judgment" standard to determine whether an executive has acted negligently,s
yet the FDIC has expressly rejected state law business judgment doctrines that
insulate directors and officers from the unpredictable effects of ordinary
negligence liability. 6 The FDIC also emphasized that gross negligence, the
24. Richard A. Posner, A Theoty of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 40-41 (1972). For a detailed
analysis of causation in tort law, see Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts:
An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975). The importance of the causation
requirement as correcting for potential hindsight bias is widely accepted in the economic
analysis of law today. E.g., STEVEN SHAvELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
252 (2004) ("One advantage of the causation requirement is that to the extent that there are
errors in the negligence determination, the negligence system takes on aspects of strict
liability, so that the problem of overdeterrence ... would be exacerbated were the scope of
liability extended to losses not caused by negligence.").
25. Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions Under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,631 ("In the event that a
covered financial company is liquidated under Title II, the FDIC as receiver will undertake
an analysis of whether the individual has breached his or her duty of care, including an
assessment of whether the individual exercised his or her business judgment.").
26. Id. ("State 'business judgment rules' and 'insulating statutes' will not shift the burden of
proof to the FDIC or increase the standard of care under which the FDIC as receiver may
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default standard under state law, will not be required. 7 The ambiguity of this
FDIC-specific "business judgment rule" could lead to significant uncertainty
because courts cannot accurately determine the ex ante optimality of
executives' complex risk-return calculations in hindsight. The potentially
crippling chilling effect of judicial second-guessing of directors' decisions is
precisely what motivated the development of the business judgment rule in
Delaware corporate law. 8 It is no mystery why Delaware courts defer to
directors' judgment unless the high bar of gross negligence is met:
mischaracterizing efficient conduct as negligent would have grave
consequences if causation did not serve as a "safety valve" for such error.29
As Posner points out, any divergence between efficiency and the applicable
standard of care matters little when damages equal actual harm. The individual
can internalize surplus utility by taking the risk and paying damages equal to
the harm. Imposing a fixed penalty of two years of pay could, however, lead to
over and underdeterrence. Overdeterrence would result if executives refrain
from taking efficient risks that may be improperly characterized as negligent in
hindsight."o Underdeterrence may also occur if executives take inefficient risks
in an attempt to capture the surplus between the risky activity's utility and the
two-year compensation amount. The potential for over and underdeterrence
increases as the gap between the expected harm and the amount of the
executive's two-year compensation grows.
recoup compensation."). Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule establishes a high
standard of liability for carelessness. See discussion infra note 28.
27. 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,631.
28. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[D]irectors
will tend to deviate from [a] rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the
corporation to undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of
personal risk relating to ex post fato claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate
loss.. . . [A] very small probability of director liability based on 'negligence', 'inattention',
'waste', etc., could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any
extent!"). Scholars have also justified the business judgment rule by pointing to the risk of
hindsight bias. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83, 114-16 (2004); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to
the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD.
L. REV 398, 443 (2007).
2g. Posner, supra note 24, at 41.
30. While certain forms of executive compensation in the financial sector (e.g., stock options)
might encourage inefficient risk taking, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann,
Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 251 (2010), ordinary negligence liability for any
resulting harm would sufficiently counteract these incentives by imposing damages equal to
resulting harm. Nonetheless, making causation rebuttable and the recoupment award
adjustable to proven damages would ensure efficiency while granting the FDIC the
evidentiary advantage of shifting the burden of proof to the executive. See infra Part IV.
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Admittedly, the recent financial crisis has shown that there is a general
problem of underdeterrence of risky conduct imposing social externalities.
However, the proposed rule would lead to inefficient overdeterrence and
distort the market for executive talent, rendering the proposed rule less
effective than other approaches at reducing systemic risk." Moreover, along
with the reform outlined in this Comment, the proposed rule goes a long way
toward reducing underdeterrence. If individual executives take reckless risks
with an expected utility in excess of two years of pay, the potential for
recoupment for actual harm would counteract the incentive to capture such
surplus as personal compensation." The FDIC can also pursue state law gross
negligence actions in parallel, permitting the recovery of damages in excess of
the two-year pay amount and negating residual underdeterrence." The FDIC
could rebut the business judgment rule by showing that an extraordinarily
reckless decision was uninformed or made in bad faith.' Injury to the firm
arising from decisions protected by the business judgment rule yet captured by
the executive as personal compensation is compensable according to existing
negligence law."
31. For a comprehensive discussion of ways to reduce the social externality of systemic risk, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (20o8).
32. While the executive would discount potential recoupment liability by the probability of the
firm's failure, the expected payoff of the activity would likely correlate with this probability
of failure because greater reward implies greater risk.
33. See 12 C.F.R. § 380.7(c) (2012).
34. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) ("Where directors fail to act in the
face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary
obligation in good faith." (citation omitted)); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) ("[T]he party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the
presumption that its business judgment was an informed one."), overruled on other grounds
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
3s. The broader question of whether corporate law provides proper liability incentives apart
from executive compensation for management to counter inappropriate risk taking is
outside the scope of this Comment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that lowering the
general standard for managerial liability for failed firms-for example, by eliminating the
business judgment rule-could have crippling consequences. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods
Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996); Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 114-15
("[T]here is a substantial risk that suing shareholders and reviewing judges will be unable
to distinguish between competent and negligent management because bad outcomes will be
regarded, ex post, as having been foreseeable and, therefore, preventable ex ante. If liability
results from bad outcomes, without regard to the ex ante quality of the decision or the
decision-making process, however, managers will be discouraged from taking risks.");
Gold, supra note 28, at 443-45 (discussing hindsight bias and instrumental justifications for
the business judgment rule).
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Finally, some might argue that the status quo without recoupment leads to
systemic underdeterrence because an executive's negligent conduct causes
indirect, externalized harms such as a loss of confidence in financial markets.
The new recoupment rule, however, imposes liability in the absence of any
causation. Even if negligent executives should pay for harms imposed on
society, punishing harmless conduct would have significant negative
consequences by distorting the market for managerial talent and thereby
reducing competition in the financial sector.
Ill. THE CONSEQUENCES OF OVERDETERRENCE:
REDUCING COMPETITION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND
PERPETUATING "TOO BIG TO FAIL"
The overdeterrence resulting from imposing liability in the absence of
causation is likely to cause talented executives to gravitate toward well-
capitalized financial institutions that have the lowest risk of failure. At first
glance, this might seem beneficial, but as smaller firms lose highly skilled
managers who refuse to put two years of compensation at risk for engaging in
harmless behavior, recoupment will lead to greater market concentration in the
financial services industry. This market concentration will further perpetuate
the dangerous phenomenon of "too big to fail."
Firms compete for managerial talent based on an executive's opportunity
cost or "reservation value."36 As scholars have noted, "An executive's
reservation value is in part a function of her appetite for risk. A firm that
requires a risk-averse executive to accept risky elements of compensation will
have to provide more total compensation on an expected value basis to offset
risk-bearing costs."" The uncertainty surrounding the standard of care under
the new rules and the charged political atmosphere accompanying the failure of
financial institutions would likely lead executives to assume a high probability
of recoupment liability under FDIC receivership. Thus, for any individual
subject to recoupment, his or her expected compensation is discounted by a
factor approaching two times the probability of the firm's failure. For example,
if the firm has a ten percent chance of failure in a given year, the expected value
36. Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design ofExecutive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2oo2).
37. Id. at 762-63. This notion of "risk-adjusted pay" is widely accepted in the financial literature.
E.g., Martin J. Conyon et al., Are U.S. CEOs Paid More than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-
Adjusted Pay, 24 REv. FIN. STUD. 402 (2011); Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, The Effect ofRisk
on the CEO Market, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2822, 2822-24 (2011); Brian J. Hall & Kevin J.
Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. Accr. & EcoN. 3, 7 (2002).
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of the executive's annual pay might be reduced by as much as twenty percent."
This discount can impose a substantial competitive burden on firms that are
perceived as relatively more likely to fail.
Management theory holds that all else being equal, firms with more human
capital that is rare and valuable will have a competitive advantage in the
marketplace.3 9 As empirical studies and intuition suggest, competent senior
executives and directors of financial institutions are both rare and valuable. 40
The human capital advantage that would inure to the most capitalized firms
perceived as having the lowest chances of failure would tilt the competitive
landscape in their favor, trapping relatively less-capitalized firms in a vicious
cycle of increasing likelihood of failure and departure of even more talent
because of the resulting lower expected value of compensation. Moreover,
while insurance might reduce the absolute cost imposed by the recoupment
regime, riskier firms will still face a substantial disadvantage relative to
competitors perceived as having a lower probability of failure.4 ' Loss shifting
38. The "in default or in danger of default" criterion for recoupment, see 12 U.S.C.A. 5
5383(c)(4) (West 2012), implies that private sector alternatives have been exhausted.
Executives might assign some probability to the outcome that the firm is not declared
systemically important but rather enters ordinary bankruptcy proceedings instead of FDIC
receivership. However, the uncertainty inherent in the systemic risk determination would
likely render this probability very small. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
3g. See, e.g., Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99,
105-07 (1991).
40. See, e.g., Charles P. Himmelberg & R. Glenn Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for
CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 20 (Mar. 6, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.comr/abstract=236089 ("[T]he supply of CEOs who are capable of
running [large] firms is relatively less elastic.").
41. Interestingly, in April 2011 one insurer announced an "FDIC Receivership Endorsement" as
an add-on to its directors and officers policy. Press Release, Marsh, Marsh Launches First-
of-Its Kind Dodd-Frank/FDIC Receivership Endorsement (Apr. 21, 2011), http://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/2o110421005208/en/Marsh-Launches-First-of-its-Kind
-Dodd-FrankFDIC-Receivership-Endorsement. However, as no recoupment claims have
been filed yet, the economic viability of insuring against a risk of harmless negligence
remains untested and uncertain. Moreover, the enforceability of such indemnification is
unclear because it undermines the personal liability at the heart of the recoupment regime.
Cf Cohen v. Viray, 622 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2010) (invalidating corporate indemnification of
CEO and CFO from clawback liability under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). While
Cohen concerned indemnification, clawback insurance would have a similar effect of
undermining personal liability. Indeed, in May 2012, Representative Barney Frank
introduced H.R. 5860, which would expressly prohibit "insur[ing,] ... hedg[ing] against,
or otherwise transfer[ring] the risks" of recoupment liability. HR. 586o, 112th Cong.
(2012); see also Alexandra Alper & Ben Berkowitz, Representative Frank Offers Bill To Bar
Insurance on Claw-Backs, REUTERS, May 30, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article
/2012/ 5 /3o/us-usa-congress-clawbacks-idUSBRE84T572o12o530?irpc=932 (suggesting
that Representative Frank introduced this bill in response to the "FDIC Receivership
122:507 2012
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may improve the efficiency of the recoupment regime, but each firm's premium
would still reflect its idiosyncratic risk of recoupment. Insuring a riskier firm
would naturally command a higher premium, imposing a greater cost on firms
perceived as more likely to fail relative to their competitors.
The anticompetitive effects of recoupment will perpetuate the dangerous
phenomenon of "too big to fail" financial firms. Title II was intended to end
"too big to fail" by ensuring that failed nonbank financial institutions undergo
orderly liquidations rather than chaotic bankruptcies (e.g., Lehman Brothers)
or ad hoc bailouts (e.g., Bear Stearns). Yet the higher cost imposed by
recoupment on firms perceived as riskier will promote market concentration
and encourage the emergence of a small number of large, stable institutions.
Indeed, the high cost of compliance with Dodd-Frank is already serving as an
impetus for mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector. 4  The heavy
burden imposed by recoupment on firms perceived as more likely to fail will
facilitate such market concentration even further. Moreover, as the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas recently emphasized, the largest financial institutions
"often follow parallel business strategies and hold similar assets," making it
likely that they will fail simultaneously.' The failure of several large
institutions at once - "too many to fail" -would likely be too catastrophic to
permit liquidation under Title II.4s Firms that reach the requisite size and
correlated risk of failure could credibly offer executive compensation with little
to no recoupment potential, further obtaining a competitive advantage in the
market for managerial talent.
Some would argue that these anticompetitive effects are exaggerated
because relatively few nonbank financial institutions are systemically
Endorsement" offered by Marsh). Furthermore, the insurance premium would be tied to
the firm's likelihood of failure, imposing a cost analogous to compensating the executive
directly for the increased recoupment risk. While an insurer might bear this risk more
cheaply than a financial institution, riskier firms would still face a competitive disadvantage
from these increased costs.
42. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. 5 5384(a) ("It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide the necessary
authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral
hazard."); id. § 5394(a) ("All financial companies put into receivership under this
subchapter shall be liquidated,").
43. See Richard Smith, US Bank Regulation-From Millstone to M&A Deal Driver?, FIN. NEWS
(Apr. n1, 2012), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2ol2-04-1/richard-smith-allen-overy
-mergers-acquisitions?mod=sectionheadlines-AM-IB.
44. Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why We Must End Too Big To Fail-Now-2oii Annual
Report, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL. 19 (2on), http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents
/fed/annual/2oni/ari.pdf (footnote omitted).
45 Id.
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important. Admittedly, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has
adopted fairly stringent criteria for designating nonbank financial firms as
posing systemic risk upon failure,"6 and only eight U.S. financial institutions
have been publicly designated as systemically important by the international
Financial Stability Board.17 However, the FSOC's ex ante designation of a firm
as systemically important under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act is entirely
independent of the FDIC's ex post determination under Title II, which triggers
recoupment.4' The recent financial crisis has shown that it is not always
possible to anticipate in advance which firms will endanger the stability of the
financial system. 49 For example, even the failure of a small hedge fund known
for holding a popular asset class could precipitate a market-wide panic.so The
inability to determine in advance which firms would be designated systemically
important-as well as the inherent uncertainty in the decision to subject an
institution to recoupments' - could lead executives of many nonbank firms in
46. See 12 C.F.R. § 131o app. A (2012).
47. Policy Measures To Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD. 4
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r-il04bb.pdf.
48. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5383(b)(1) (West 2012) makes no mention of the ex ante designation of a
nonbank financial institution as systemically important under 12 U.S.CA. § 5330(a),
implying that such a designation is independent of the decision to place an institution into
FDIC receivership under Title II.
49. Compare Felix Salmon, How Systemically Important Is Bear Stearns?, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 16,
2008), http://seekingalpha.coni/article/68640-how-systemically-important-is-bear-stearns
(discussing the debate over whether Bear Steams is systemically important and
acknowledging two respected investors' views that it is not), with What Did the Fed Do To
Combat the Financial Crisis?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/econanswers
/FR.Qi.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (stating that Bear Stearns was a systemically
important financial institution because its failure "risked a domino effect that would have
severely disrupted financial markets").
50. Interestingly, the recent crisis was precipitated by the failure of relatively small firms
holding subprime mortgage-backed securities. See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, FIN.
CRIUSIS INQUIRY COMM'N 233 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO
-FCIC.pdf.
51. The decision to subject an institution to recoupment is ultimately left in the hands of the
Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary must receive a written recommendation from the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the FDIC addressing eight factors regarding the
financial company and the effect of default. 12 U.S.C.A. 5 5383(a)(1)-(2). Even after
receiving a written recommendation, the Secretary retains discretion to make the final
decision after weighing seven additional factors. Id. § 5383(b)(2). The subjectivity inherent
in these multifactor determinations would likely engender significant uncertainty among
financial executives.
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the financial sector to plan for the worst-case scenario of FDIC receivership and
adjust their expected compensation accordingly.s2
IV. A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF CAUSATION
Preventing these inefficiencies and anticompetitive effects requires a simple
solution: causation should be a rebuttable presumption and the two-year
compensation amount merely a default award, adjustable to actual damage
upon proof. Admittedly, it is unclear whether the statutory language referring
to "any compensation received during the 2-year period"" can be construed as
merely a presumption rebuttable by showing actual injury. Nonetheless, even if
a statutory change is required, this is the right approach. Retaining a
presumption of causation would facilitate holding executives of failed financial
institutions accountable, as information asymmetries likely place the FDIC at
an evidentiary disadvantage when proving causation. It would likely be more
costly for the FDIC to obtain the requisite internal accounting information to
establish causation than for the executive to show that other factors were
responsible for the firm's failure. Yet permitting executives to disprove this
presumption of causation and establish lower damages would also eliminate
overdeterrence because damages would more accurately approximate actual
harm, if any. For example, an executive could show that any allegedly reckless
conduct-e.g., failure to adequately supervise trading-did not causally
contribute to the firm's failure because market forces caused asset values to
plummet. Such a decline in asset values would have forced the firm into
insolvency even if the executive had not engaged in the allegedly negligent
conduct.
As these informational advantages are known ex ante, executives will
anticipate that regardless of the probability of failure, it would be relatively
inexpensive to disprove the causal link necessary for recoupment liability.14
This would eliminate the competitive advantage held by the largest firms
because executives would discount potential recoupment liability solely by the
likelihood of their conduct causing actual harm. As this probability depends on
52. The recent availability of an "FDIC Receivership Endorsement" for directors' and officers'
insurance indicates that this risk is already imposing a cost on firms. See supra note 41.
53. 12 U.S.C.A. 5 5390(s).
54. It is possible that rebutting causation may be too expensive (in absolute terms) for even a
rebuttable presumption to counteract the ex ante overdeterrence described supra Part II. Yet
this is still likely the best possible solution because removing the responsibility-based
presumptions at the core of the recoupment regime would contradict the statutory language
that recoupment impose liability beyond existing state law negligence theories based on
conduct alone.
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the nature of the executive's conduct, it would not vary across firms based on
perceived risk of failure. This would level the playing field among financial
institutions competing for executive talent, promoting healthy competition and
reversing the arbitrary advantages conferred by the current regime on large,
potentially "too big to fail" firms.
CONCLUSION
In promulgating these rules, the FDIC undoubtedly sought to discourage
negligent management of institutions posing a substantial risk to the financial
system. Such a goal is laudable. As defined in the new rules, recoupment is
particularly appealing because its presumptions enable the FDIC to pursue
executives without the burden of affirmatively proving every element of
negligence. Yet by penalizing executives who caused the company little or no
loss, the FDIC's new rules institute an inefficient liability regime. Such
inefficiency would lead to overdeterrence and encourage executives to gravitate
to the most stable financial institutions, because riskier firms face a competitive
disadvantage with executive compensation as a result of the higher likelihood
of recoupment. The anticompetitive effects of recoupment would promote
concentration in the financial sector and facilitate the emergence of "too big to
fail" institutions.
The solution is simple: causation should be a rebuttable presumption and
the two-year compensation amount merely a default award, adjustable to
actual damage upon proof. The informational advantages held by executives
would permit cheaply disproving the presumption of causation, leading
executives to discount potential recoupment liability solely by the likelihood of
causing actual harm. This probability would not vary across firms on the basis
of size, leveling the playing field among financial institutions competing for
executive talent.
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